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## A Dilemma of Principles: The Challenges of Hybrid Warfare From a NATO Perspective

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has a unique perspective on the many challenges hybrid warfare presents to Europe's defense. After 12 years of concentrating on collective security (Rowberry, 2012), NATO is altering strategic and operational priorities because of the Russian Federation's engagement in hybrid warfare. The alliance is investing in the NATO Response Force (NRF), meaning special operations forces (SOF) will provide greater support to European collective defense (NATO, 2015a). Thus, it is valuable for the SOF community to understand the complexities influencing NATO's position in the current security environment.

Keywords: defense, NATO, Russia, hybrid warfare, information operations, psychological operations, SOF, NATO SOF, cultural intelligence, Russian military doctrine, international security, international community

The Alliance's principles are adversarial leverage in hybrid warfare, posing a dilemma in interdicting the Russian Federation's subversive activities in Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) upholds principles of doctrine and follows policy for commitments to collective defense in Europe; meanwhile, a state is gaining time and opportunity for political–military objectives by maneuvering shrewdly through rules-based security architecture. Whether it concerns information, treaties, or covert military activities, the challenges present NATO with a dilemma of principles influencing NATO's perspective of and response to hybrid warfare.

The term *hybrid warfare* has neither an official NATO definition nor doctrine to explain strategic, operational, and tactical detail. Nevertheless, NATO officials use the phrases *hybrid threat* and *hybrid warfare* over other terminology, making it relevant to examine what it signifies. The NATO Capstone Concept attributes an adversarial entity using hybrid tactics with “the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives” (Miklaucic, 2011). Hybrid threats thrive in the unconstrained operating environment (NATO Allied Command Transformation [ACT], 2011), which can be urban and rural terrain as well as informational and cyber space.

A nonstate actor can generate hybrid threats. An example is the Islamic State, which combines global information operations, insurgency, civil war, and terrorism for battlefield

success in Syria, Iraq, and Libya.<sup>1</sup> In 2015 the now former chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Dutch general Knud Bartels, referred to the Islamic State as a hybrid model (Giegerich, 2015). The concept of a hybrid model suggests that hybrid warfare can take different forms depending on attributes particular to nonstate and state actors. Since hybrid threats come in different forms, NATO facilitates communication among NATO members and those involved in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) to share strategies and form coalitions to address regional security issues and counterterrorism efforts.

Nonstate actors pose a dynamic security threat to the NATO member nations and PfP. However, the breadth of hard and soft power necessary to pose an imminent threat to NATO's territorial integrity and political cohesion is beyond the scope of a nonstate actor.<sup>2</sup> The greater concern for NATO is a state actor engaging in hybrid warfare as a holistic use of overt and covert kinetic and nonkinetic military activities, and using state-run tools to influence a foreign civilian population and to control foreign political decisions (Pindják, 2014).

The term *hybrid warfare* has its share of detractors. Some argue the term to be vague because it is an "umbrella term" (Van Puyvelde, 2015), or it is the same struggle between stronger and weaker entities using all means necessary (Raitasalo, 2015). However, there are two intertwined peculiarities distinguishing hybrid warfare for NATO: (a) a state's ability to comprehensively utilize political, diplomatic, military, economic, and social means to manipulate political objectives abroad; and (b) a state's practice to mask or deny attribution. To explain why these two elements are important, NATO's political command structure requires explanation.

NATO is an international political–military collective defense organization with 28 members. Its core principles are collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security (NATO, 2010). The political command structure starts with the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which is composed of national representatives acting as the ultimate approval authority for NATO, and all decisions are based on consensus.<sup>3</sup> The consensus of all 28 member nations is required to invoke an article of the 1949 Washington Treaty (NATO, 1949), meaning the threat must be weighed uniformly by each nation on political and diplomatic levels and through consultation. NATO's political command structure is a testament to contemporary democratic principles, because the power over military assets rests with elected civilian nationals.

NATO's military power is a reflection of voluntary contribution, and the structures coordinating military assets follow principle-driven doctrine and policy based on political command decisions. The early phases of the NATO Crisis Management Process seek to mitigate escalation of conflict through diplomatic and political means. In the case that a state actor denies culpability for subversive military and nonmilitary activities, it impedes a NATO military response through the political command structure. This creates a response dilemma for NATO owing to the precarious nature of upholding principles while countering an adversary that leverages these professional standards for advantage.

<sup>1</sup> Also known as ISIS, ISIL, and Da'ish, among other names. The term *Islamic State* implies neither official nor recognized statehood.

<sup>2</sup> There are exceptional non-state actors whose power subjugates the authority of official state military and security forces, which can prompt capacity-building missions based on official state request and authority from the United Nations, such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Mandate. Islamic State is an example of an entity that could be an exception: It floats between nonstate and state actor, like a governing actor; it controls territory, deploys forces, governs state assets, and performs state duties, despite Syrian State and Iraqi State military resistance.

<sup>3</sup> For nuclear-related matters, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group is the ultimate authority. NATO military action is tied to the United Nations Security Council and its mandates.

The Russian Federation cannot compete with the military assets NATO is able to amalgamate, which is 10 times the armed force of Russia, as explained by Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2015 (Putin, 2015). This is why Russian hybrid warfare strategy seeks to break the Alliance by making NATO look weak in collective defense, which can rattle member and partner commitments. Furthermore, the Russian Federation does not make military decisions based on multinational consensus, thus having the flexibility to ignore international standards and agreements. By leveraging this advantage and impeding a NATO military response, the Russian Federation pursues its own political–military objectives, as seen in Ukrainian territory (NATO, 2014a).

The 2014 Maidan protests in Kiev showed a Ukraine wanting reform and membership in NATO (Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty [RFERL], 2015). This prospect threatens Russian regional influence, thus encouraging a need to detour Western investment in Ukraine by contributing to armed conflict (NATO, 2015b). The Russian Federation's tactic to prevent Ukraine's bid to join NATO used the Alliance's standards in the Membership Action Plan (MAP, 1999): A state requesting to join NATO must resolve all internal conflict and external border disputes.

During the Maidan protests, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich literally fled Ukraine for Moscow in February 2014, meaning a pro-Russian Ukrainian political authority no longer led Ukraine. The Russian Federation perceived several risks, such as the future of the Kharkiv Pact, energy security, and an encroaching NATO presence threatening Western dominance. There is a correlation between the Russian Federation's political interests, the Russian military's view on contemporary warfare, and consequent military and nonmilitary activities.

Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the general staff of the armed forces of Russia and first deputy defense minister army general, provided his perception of modern warfare in a December 2013 article. General Gerasimov (2013) explained the evolution of contemporary warfare: It begins by targeting a civilian population through a broad range of economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary means to instigate protest and revolt; once the necessary amount of pressure is placed on the civilian population, overt military activities can be used to ensure success. General Gerasimov's observations on modern conflict are an undertone in the unclassified Russian military doctrine that was updated in 2014, several months after his published article.

According to the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (MDRF, 2014), modern warfare is a complex mix of special operations, military force, and nonmilitary means of a political, economical, and informational character (articles 7, 15.a). In addition, Russian State defense planning and political–military objectives necessitate political, diplomatic and economic means, nongovernmental assets, international organizations and private firms in military defense, and investment in special operations, ground forces, and information operations (article 9). Indeed, MDRF cites NATO as a territorial threat to the Russian Federation, its citizens, and partners (MDRF, 2014, articles 5, 12.a).

When considering Russian political objectives in tandem with Russian military conceptual thought and defense planning, a parallel exists between NATO's perception of hybrid warfare and the Russian Federation's activities aimed at Eastern Europe. This correlation is evident in three categories: (a) maneuvering through international laws and treaties as a signatory; (b) targeting of foreign civilian populations with information and psychological operations, disinformation, and propaganda; and (c) prevarication on covert and overt military operations.

## POLITICAL–DIPLOMATIC TACTICS: ACTS, AGREEMENTS, AND TREATIES

Treaties and agreements are only as effective as the guarantors' commitment to the spirit and purpose of the documents. From NATO's perspective, the Russian Federation is violating principles of the NATO–Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations (1997). Specific transgressions involve transparency, rule of law, respecting state sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, and prevention of conflicts (Founding Act, 1997). Even with NATO-specific agreements aside, the Russian Federation exemplifies political–diplomatic tactics of hybrid warfare with additional transgressions of the Vienna Document, the Minsk Agreement, and the Open Skies Treaty.

As part of European cooperative security, the Vienna Document specifies that participating states must inform of military activities with guidelines such as the amassing of 13,000 or more troops (Arms Control Association, 2010).<sup>4</sup> The number of Russian troops involved in exercises was kept slightly under the Vienna Document's stated limit (NATO School Oberammergau, 2015), but the failure to invite for observation violated the agreement. Moreover, the Russian Federation refused transparency on military activities near Ukraine's border despite stipulations in the Vienna Document (Baer, 2014a). While signatories of the Vienna Document and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) attempt to push compliance, Russian military activities continue. Not only does this impact decisions from NATO's political command structure, it also poses a dilemma for NATO and Member nations to mitigate conflict in Ukraine.

The Alliance supports diplomatic tools for conflict resolution, such as the Minsk Agreement, which intends to de-escalate fighting in Ukraine. Intermittently, eastern separatists, augmented by the Russian military, break ceasefires, and firefights go back and forth (Stoltenberg, 2015b). Interestingly, the Russian Federation strategically implements ceasefires through diplomatic means to assist operations (Davis, 2014). Through complicated maneuvers, the Russian military uses distraction tactics to obstruct detection of military activities near Ukraine's border (Davis, 2014). In March 2014, Ukraine invoked article 14 of the NATO–Ukraine Charter; by April, Ukraine officially and publicly requested NATO's assistance (NATO, 2015c). However, NATO principles and commitments limit the extent of military support to Ukraine.

The Open Skies Treaty allows transparency to generate confidence, which is why any hindrance to signatories therein is viewed as deception. The Open Skies Treaty is a paper instrument verifying military activity that the Russian Federation obstructs through airspace restrictions and prevention of quota flights (Delawie, 2015). By taking advantage of technicalities in the Open Skies Treaty, the Russian Federation is able to pursue its military objectives while hindering observation by NATO members.

Like military activities, compliance with ballistic arms reduction and nuclear weapon–related treaties is vital to building trust among nations. In 2014, the United States stated that the Russian Federation had violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (BBC United States and Canada, 2014). Actually enforcing the Russian Federation's transparency and compliance to treaties is a dubious endeavor, because it centers on voluntary compliance (Dodge, 2014). A similar dilemma exists for other weapons of mass destruction, such as

<sup>4</sup> The Vienna Document stipulates observation for 13,000 troops and advance notification for 9,000 troops.

chemical, biological, and radiological weapons (Vershbow, 2015). Despite the actions of the Russian Federation, the guiding principles and inherent compliance requirements of treaties, agreements, and acts dictate NATO's political and military decision-making process.

The Russian Federation does not disregard all international commitments, because the intent is to remain a global player. The intermittent transgressions intend to impede NATO military response, enhance Russian military capabilities, and block access to certain Russian military activities. The dilemma for NATO is that the Russian Federation is able to create time and opportunity for its political–military endeavors while remaining influential and active in European and international security.

### POLITICAL–INFORMATIONAL TACTICS: INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS, AND PROPAGANDA

Army General Gerasimov (2013) characterizes modern warfare as being “waged from a basis of clandestine, military means of informational and kinetic special operations.” The Russian Federation views the control of information and the power of influence over foreign and domestic populations as key to successful, long-term political–military objectives. This is why information and psychological operations have a critical role in kinetic military operations. The following examples of Crimea, Ukraine, and Latvia illustrate NATO's challenge in countering the Russian Federation's proficiency in targeting Russian-speaking populations.

#### Crimea

The Russian Federation targeted the Crimean civilian population and the Russian-speaking world by framing the 2014 annexation of Crimea with history and culture. The Russian storyline begins with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev gifting Crimea to Ukraine in 1954, and framing the past 60 years as merely a prolonged absence. On Russian national television, President Putin expressed tearful joy that the Crimean people were finally coming back home to Russia (Nevskie Novosti, 2014). It is important to note that narrative and psychological operations are valued at the highest political echelon of the Russian State because investment starts at the top.

#### Ukraine

In March 2015, a Russian State–supported documentary, *Crimea's Path Home*, traced the Maidan protests to Crimea's annexation. It highlights the Russian State's role as saving and supporting Ukraine during a tragic period (Kondrashov, 2015). *Crimea's Path Home* defends covert military operations and employs Putin as a guide to relate the story with a personal touch. This type of well-made Russian media content is strategic because it fits into a comprehensive political narrative understandable to any Russian-speaking audience.

In hybrid warfare strategy, information operations facilitate political–military objectives if the target civilian population perceives coercive military force as an extension of friendly, humanitarian assistance. In 2013, Putin described Ukrainians and Russians as one people, with the goal of garnering pro-Russian support from Ukrainian popular opinion. In 2014, Putin declared the future of Ukraine and Russia to be one, and called the security of Ukraine

a duty for Russia; approval of military force from the Russian Duma followed soon afterward (Nevskie Novosti, 2014). If a military invasion of Ukraine proves prosperous for the Russian Federation, the narrative is already established to support kinetic military operations; however, if a military invasion proves too laborious, the Ukrainian civilian population remains malleable to influence for future endeavors. Either way, the Russian Federation positions itself advantageously.

## Latvia

As a NATO and European Union member, Latvia withstands Russian media influence more than Ukraine. Nevertheless, Latvians are still a target audience for Russian State disinformation campaigns and propaganda because of language and history. The Russian State-operated news channel Rossiya 1 aired a report titled “Americans at Our Borders,” which portrayed NATO training exercises outside of Riga as preparation for an invasion of Russia. The report attempted to rattle Latvian popular support by accusing NATO soldiers as being detrimental to Latvia’s civilian population. Even a former Soviet Union war veteran stated, “Wherever America goes, it’s a mess” (Kiselev, 2015a). There is an emphasis on blaming the United States in order not to alienate European partners. Over time, this type of corrosive disinformation can influence civilian populations with access to Russian State news channels.

In March 2015, Russian State-operated news channel Vesti aired a report titled “Breedlove Against Europeans,” which recapped an article published by German newspaper *Der Spiegel* (Gebauer, 2015). The Russian version claims that the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), U.S. Air Force General Philippe Breedlove, fabricates intelligence on Russian military activities in and near Ukraine, as well as impedes Germany’s diplomatic approach to Russia (Kiselev, 2015b). The Vesti report is for a Russian-speaking audience and serves two purposes for Russian information operations: (a) it proliferates the falsehood that Germany distrusts NATO and SACEUR; and (b) Germany does not perceive Russia as a threat to Ukraine.

Russian military doctrine stipulates targeting civilian populations with information under the purpose of protecting history, spirituality, and tradition (MDRF, 2014). On the contrary, NATO information and psychological operations are subject to restrictions. If the Alliance deviated from policy to compete with the Russian strategy, it would break principles established to protect civilians from manipulation and subversive foreign influence.

The Alliance communicates through NATO Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy with official statements, releases, and online information (NATO International Military Staff [IMS], 2011). Every word reflects all 28 nations, which is why word choice and assessments are subject to standards of image, accuracy, and implication. NATO uses social media tools to inform of the Alliance’s activities, maintaining restrictions on content as per NATO STRATCOM guidelines, approved audiences, and in adherence to Allied Command Operations (ACO) Social Media Policy (NATO Public Affairs Office [PAO], 2014). However, the use of digital content and social media that has an official NATO seal to disseminate counter information is limited.

NATO officials counter disinformation with fact, as demonstrated by General Breedlove. In response to *Der Spiegel*’s article, General Breedlove explained that NATO intelligence reports and measurements of analysis vary by nation (Kirschbaum and Korkemeier, 2015). The NATO website published “NATO–Russia Relations: The Facts,” available in Russian,

Ukrainian, English, and French (NATO, 2015b). The truth and facts are powerful; however, in certain circles Russian propaganda still enjoys an advantage of perception. The Russian State has the advantage of guiding Russian media without national caveats and multinational consensus.

### POLITICAL–MILITARY TACTICS: COVERT AND OVERT DEPLOYMENT OF MILITARY AND STATE SECURITY FORCES

Another dilemma confronts NATO when a state engages in subversive covert military activities abroad, because it can influence political change for undetected periods. Even after detection occurs, lack of official admission by the infringing state impedes decisions at NATO's political level. The Russian Federation demonstrated this hybrid warfare tactic with the annexation of Crimea to achieve political–military objectives in Eastern Europe.

In February 2014, video footage on social media appeared of armed, masked Russian troops without insignia driving unmarked transport vehicles in Crimea (Krayutsa, 2014); in addition, video footage of the seizure of Crimea's parliament supported assessments of Russian special forces' involvement (Synovitz, 2014). Despite evidence on the Internet from witnesses in Crimea, the Russian Federation officially denied any military involvement in Crimea outside of regular deployments.

The International Community's outrage over covert Russian military operations coercing the Crimean population pressured Russian officials to provide a defense. Now-deposed Ukrainian President Yanukovich stated he requested Russia's military assistance to maintain control of Ukraine in a letter dated March 1st, 2014 (RFERL, 2014). The same day, the Russian Duma approved deployment of Russian military forces to Ukraine under reasons of Ukrainian national security and protecting Russian citizens (Perviy Kanal, 2014). By March 24, 2014, the last Ukrainian military base, Feodosia, was seized by the Russian military eight days after a Crimean referendum passed to join the Russian Federation (BBC Europe, 2014). By using accepted NATO and international standards of humanitarian aid, request for assistance and democratic voting, the Russian Federation was able to deter a potential NATO military response in Crimea.

By April 17, 2014, Russian President Putin had contradicted his earlier statements, confirming the presence of Russian troops in Crimea under the pretext of "keeping order during elections and upholding the will of the Crimean people" (Putin, 2014). Once the referendum to join passed, the preexisting Russian military forces enforced Crimea's new status as part of the Russian Federation, affording the Russian State with a prime, full-time military position on the Black Sea. The obstacle for NATO was that the Russian Federation's military activities in Crimea occurred clandestinely and quickly.

According to the OSCE and NATO, the Russian Federation deployed covert military personnel to Eastern Ukraine to augment and support civilian combatant groups opposing the Ukrainian government (Baer, 2014). Ukrainian military officials claimed the presence of Chechen State military in Rostov-na-Donu and Donetsk (Ibragimov and Ivanov, 2014), which Ramzan Kadyrov, the President of Chechnya, denied (BBC Russian Service, 2014). Assertions of Russian paramilitary training, special operations, and armed support of Ukrainian separatists have persisted since 2013 (Ukraine Today, 2014). However, the characteristics of civil war,

insurgency, and foreign paramilitary training of civilians in Eastern Ukraine test the boundaries of NATO's military assistance limitations.

NATO responded by suspending the NATO–Russia Council on April 1st, 2014, and limiting cooperation to diplomatic dialogue (Vale, 2014). Indeed, NATO released intelligence satellite images of Russian military tanks in rebel-held areas of Eastern Ukraine to defend assertions (NATO ACO, 2014). However, the Russian Federation was able to achieve political–military objectives by leveraging NATO's political command structure and bureaucratic construction. As General Breedlove explained, hybrid warfare is particularly challenging because of the lack of attribution from a state (Garamone, 2015). Still, neither the Russian Federation nor its Federal Republics admits participation in Ukraine's continuing crisis.

### OVERT POSTURING: MISSILE DEFENSE AND CYBERSPACE

NATO and the Russian Federation have a commonality: Both derive significant power and authority from nuclear weapons and first-strike capabilities.<sup>5</sup> According to Russian military doctrine, the future rests on tactical nuclear weapons, air–space defense, ballistic missile capabilities, robotic advancements, and space military technologies (TVTS, 2015). Russian military defense planning includes investments in cyberspace, space, and air-defense missile systems (Gerasimov, 2014), indicating an increase in spending for preparation of future conflict and warfare.

Several NATO members and the Russian Federation are signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. While many NATO members prefer to eliminate nuclear weapons from political strategy, NATO is and will remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear deterrence is a powerful political tool in international security (NATO, 2012). For deterrence against Russian State posturing, the forward deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe is technically an option (Millar, 2003). Conversely, it poses a dilemma for NATO members in terms of commitments to nonproliferation and disarmament.

The fact that the Russian Federation is enhancing its military and missile defense systems means NATO has to evolve with missile defense, space, and cyber technologies and security. NATO joint operations, global communications, and missile defense systems depend on interconnected relationships of space and cyberspace (Swarts, 2015), meaning all these network systems are targets. This is an avenue of hybrid warfare, considering reports of Russian State involvement in cyber hacking Ukrainian intelligence communications (Davis, 2014), and U.S. government systems (Fox-Brewster, 2015). Cyber attacks can invoke article 5 (McLeary, 2015), and the discussion for greater cyber security continues on NATO's political level, but like all decisions it must meet consensus.

Defense against hybrid warfare is a financial dilemma for NATO because it requires making several costly areas top priorities. Economic circumstances impact national budgets, which

<sup>5</sup> NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (NIAMD) is the Alliance's construct to defend against ballistic missile attacks and other airborne lethal objects. NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) is the alliance's capacity for collective defense against ballistic missiles and plays a role in deterrence against hybrid warfare. For reference, see NATO, 2016; NATO, 2014b.

consequently affects common funding afforded to NATO by each nation. The consequence of shrinking budgets means NATO bodies have to set priorities within the parameters of multinational budgetary restrictions.

With the weight of these dilemmas in mind, NATO is developing a comprehensive approach for collective defense against hybrid warfare. Part of the strategy includes ushering the kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities of NATO SOF to the forefront, under the command of SACEUR. NATO Special Operations Headquarters coordinates and directs the flexibility and interoperability of the NATO Response Force (NRF) (Stoltenberg, 2015b). The NRF is increasing from 13,000 to 30,000 personnel, including a rapid reinforcement capability the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).

The VJTF, also referred to as the Spearhead Force, comprises air, maritime, and SOF that are able to deploy within 48 to 72 hours (NATO, 2014b). This resource will provide NATO decision makers with the flexibility of assets and responses imperative to counter a range of hybrid threats in real time. To support the VJTF, six commands have been activated by NATO Force Integration Units in Eastern Allied nations, providing a forward area near the Russian Federation's borders (NATO Response Force, n.d.). The dynamic skill sets of SOF are vital for NATO to handle the complexities of hybrid warfare and the multidirectional nature of international security.

During the Collective Security Treaty Organization Summit in Dushanbe on September 15, 2015, Russian President Putin announced that components of the Russian military are supporting the Syrian State with tactical military assistance under justification of fighting terrorism (Siraziev, 2015). With political and military assistance, NATO and the Russian Federation are supporting opposing entities in Ukraine, while some NATO members and the Russian Federation are supporting opposing entities in Syria. Given the quick pace of the complex security environment, greater informational capabilities for optimal situational awareness, indicators, and warnings will not cease to be a necessity for NATO. This makes SOF the ideal resource for challenges within the "gray zone" of hybrid warfare.

The Russian Federation, among others, effectively uses cultural information and the human dimension of hybrid strategy to advance objectives, which is why NATO needs parallel advantages. Instead of fundamentally changing NATO to meet these obstacles, NATO can enhance its cultural intelligence capabilities to support a wide range of operations, including informational and cyber warfare. Integrating cultural intelligence to support SOF is a natural fit, representing an opportunity for NATO in countering hybrid threats.

In many respects, it seems as though NATO is at a precipice. If NATO solely maintains the status quo, then its ability to engage in hybrid warfare is inhibited. If NATO changes its structure to adapt to evolving threats, then its founding purpose is at risk and it must renegotiate a massive, multinational, bureaucratic political–military organization. Choosing one option or the other is neither optimal nor practical, particularly considering that NATO is not a broken organization.

The path forward is rather more nuanced than direct. Whether we are facing a state or nonstate actor, the great challenge of hybrid warfare is discovering the means to engage adversaries operating with different rules, without compromising principles. As stated in article 23 of the Wales Summit: "The Alliance does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia. But we cannot and will not compromise on the principles on which our Alliance and security in Europe and North America rest" (NATO, 2014b).

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