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Dynamics of Religious Emotion I: Connections of Self, Society, and Symbols

Having established in the preceding chapters what we mean by emotion, and indicated some of the characteristic features of religious emotion, we can now develop our scheme for analysing religious emotional regimes. We begin by looking at regimes in which there are balanced and reinforcing interactions between constituent parts: individual agents, a social group, and symbols. In the next chapter we consider what happens when disruptions and disconnections occur, and balance is lost. To avoid misunderstanding it is important to emphasize at the outset that the term 'balance' does not imply any sort of normative judgement: a 'balanced' emotional regime is not inherently better or worse than a 'one-sided' one, simply different in structure.

Because the constituent elements of an emotional regime are not merely interactive but mutually constituting, we speak of them as 'dialectically' related. Dialectics refer to formative two-way processes, in which the *relata* are affected and shaped by the relation. An implication here is that novel processes emerge from the interaction of the parts that are irreducible to those parts. This is more than mere 'interaction' and covers more than mutual actions between agents: it also embraces relations between agents, community, and symbols. Dialectical relations form an entity, which is something more than the sum of its parts.

Within the framework we propose, religious emotions arise when individuals relate emotionally to religious symbols within the context of a religious community. This involves three sets of relations, which

this chapter sets out to clarify and illustrate with concrete examples from a range of different religious settings and traditions.

Objectification and subjectification

We begin, not with sociology's preferred dialectic between individual and society, but with that between persons and symbols, because for religious emotion this is as important but more neglected. Religion involves a multitude of sacred objects imbued with emotional significance. Such symbolic expressions take a range of forms including architecture, painting, sculpture, and music. All are products of human agency, yet they are ascribed supra-human qualities. As Morgan (1998: 9), in his study of the role of mass-produced images in Protestantism, puts it, the gap between signifier and signified is at least partially closed for the believer, so that the image 'possesses its referent within itself' (see also Neville 1996; Morgan 2005). An icon may seem to perform miracles by itself, entirely independent of its human producer. When a devout woman visits an Orthodox church and kisses an icon, it seems to provoke tears by its own power rather than her volition. The power of such objects is enhanced by personal and collective associations, and they often become the basis for a chain of memories. They may obtain a history and existence and 'biography' of their own, beyond that of their producers.

In this example, 'objectification' refers to the act of production which is aimed at expressing and evoking certain emotions through the icon. More broadly, objectification in our use refers to the expression of personal emotions in a symbolic object, and to that extent, in a public idiom.[1] This does not imply that an individual is in some constant state of personal emotional arousal in relation to the object. The painter of an icon, for example, may not personally feel the

[1] The term 'objectification' is used by Berger and Luckmann (1966), where it refers to the project where society emerges as an objective reality, with a history that seems independent of its human producers. This is dialectically related to processes of 'internalization' and 'externalization'. Our usage of 'objectification' differs, since it here relates to the human production of symbols, rather than to the human construction of a world view. It seemed logical to counterpoint the term objectification with the term 'subjectification'. Our concepts should be read as a dialectical pairs, and do not therefore refer to an object/subject duality.

emotions expressed by the icon (at least not all the time), but will have some awareness of the emotional effect he or she wishes to achieve, and the work will usually be inspired and directed by existing icons, which have proven themselves in this regard. As Baggley (1995: 55) puts it: 'the true iconographer is engaged in a work of spiritual expression; he is not merely repeating a form, but externalizing a spiritual reality that is part of the Orthodox tradition, and should have become a part of himself.' Although some of the most powerful religious objects are likely to be those that express their creators' deep emotions, their power also resides in their ability to evoke feeling in others.[2] Religious objectification refers to the creation of an object that aims to capture and provoke emotions that are classified as religious. This classification normally involves relating the emotions to the emotional regime of a religious order, which deems it sacred. At this point there is, therefore, a social aspect to the process, which is discussed in the next section.

A piece of sacred art such as a painting, a composition, a sculpture, or a building represents a tangible and permanent example of objectification expressing certain emotions. Rituals, drama, and music are also objectified expressions of religious emotions that have a relatively manifest and permanent form. Objectifications additionally include less tangible or permanent forms, such as telling a myth, singing a song, writing a book, or preparing a meal. Through acts of objectification, emotional expressions become fixed and communicable. Outsiders and new generations can be affected by the objects, and gain a sense of the wider regime to which they belong. The objects may also serve as emotional mediators between people, expressing feelings that would not otherwise be communicated. Many religious symbols are relatively fixed—like the authorized image of a deity. They have a permanent place in the pantheon. But each symbol may be experienced afresh by individuals in their own emotional

[2] In the orthodox tradition, an icon was painted by a monk in a monastery. The creative process took place in a group under the guidance of an experienced artist, while a monk read passages from the Bible or a saint's biography. Painting was a contemplative or meditative act, not just a technical one. The guidance of the master could ensure a necessary technical standard and that the style followed tradition. However, icons were not just esteemed by their craftsmanship or veneration for tradition. A true icon is supposed to be a manifestation of divine energies, and thus create a meeting point where a human can enter into the unseen world of the Spirit.

experience, as subjective experiences are canalized in terms of objective culture.

The range of emotions that may be conveyed by objectifications is unlimited. Moreover, the emotions provoked by sacred objects are underdetermined. The same sacred building, for example, can humble some of those who enter it and fill others with awe. As Stringer (1999) finds, part of the power of a ritual lies in its ability to provoke very different feelings—or none at all—in different participants. Nevertheless, the form of an object often has some relation to the range of emotions it evokes. Depictions of the Buddha, for example, may instil something of the serenity or joy that the image expresses. Other depictions of sacred beings have their effects by provoking, not imitation, but relationship—such as maternal tenderness for the infant Krishna, gratitude and sorrow for the crucified Christ, or fear of a heavenly Judge. An image may provoke a flash memory that helps one to cope with difficult life situations and reorient emotions—as when a taxi-driver glimpses the image of a special deity hanging from the mirror of the car. An opus of music may provoke different emotions by its harmonies, tempo, and rhythmic force. Consider Hildegard von Bingen's contemplative harmonies, Johann Sebastian Bach's strictly organized Masses, Ludwig van Beethoven's romantic Ninth Symphony, or Camille Saint-Saëns's overwhelming Third Symphony. Each is related to a different religious order and corresponds with a certain emotional scale.

Objectification does not only refer to virtuosi who create religious art for elites. It includes everyday acts such as lighting a candle, thumbing rosary beads, placing a veil over one's hair, reciting scripture, burning incense, tracing an image in the mud—or writing out a Bible by hand. The latter example comes from Park's study (2009) of Bible-copying in Korea, a recent practice that has become increasingly popular. Ninety-year-old Mrs Choi, whom Park interviews, has completed twelve handwritten copies of the whole Bible. Park explains the appeal of Bible-copying as a form of prayer and spiritual concern for the family, especially children who will inherit a Bible. When Mrs Choi copies the Bible, she has two objects in front of her besides her manuscript: a printed 'master' copy of the Bible, and photos of her children (Park 2009: 214). Objectification may also include acts of creative destruction, such as the removal or obstructions to religious practice, and acts of cleansing that remove matter from a sacred context in which it is 'out of place' (Mary Douglas's concept (1966) of dirt).

Thus, voluntary work decorating or cleaning a church, synagogue, temple, or mosque may be interpreted as objectification when it expresses religious sentiment.

Even where religious objects are common and mass produced, the emotions they provoke can be deeply meaningful to those who feel them. They crystallize and elevate, not some generic experience, but an experience that is also unique to the person who has it. An icon carried in the pocket, a set of prayer beads fingered repeatedly, a prayer mat used five times a day, a tattered image of Ganesha on the wall—these objects, which may appear like rubbish to others, can have an irreplaceable emotional power for those to whom they belong. Their power accrues over time, and with repeated association. As Pratt (1920: 602) comments, 'nearly all religious symbolism that ever becomes really potent in an individual's experience comes into his life in childhood': songs sung in infancy, pictures gazed on at school, words repeated at every mealtime, smells encountered when worshipping—these may be powerful enough to provoke tidal waves of emotion in later life. Likewise, religious objects handed down over generations, ancestors worshipped at a household shrine, words repeated at the funeral of father, grandfather, and great grandfather, may have an emotional force so strong that it is either cherished—or rejected in an act of life-changing rebellion (Hervieu-Léger 2000).

This brings us to the subjective aspect of the dialectical relation. 'Subjectification' involves more than perceiving the object through the senses and understanding its emotional message intellectually, and more even than altering bodily practice in response to a material setting.[3] In religious subjectification, an object provokes an emotional reaction that is considered religious. In many religious contexts, the

[3] Obeyesekere (1981: 123) also writes that 'subjectification is the opposite of objectification: cultural ideas are used to justify the introduction of innovative acts and meanings. Subjective imagery is to subjectification what personal symbols are to objectification. The former help externalized (but do not objectify) internal psychic states; yet such subjective externalizations do not, and cannot, constitute a part of the publicly accepted culture.' The theme of subjectification has been discussed in literature on 'religious experience' by psychologists of religion, such as Allport's well-known contrast (1950) between an 'extrinsic', institution-oriented, and an 'intrinsic', interior-oriented religiosity. An 'intrinsic' interior-oriented religious person lives her (or his) religion. Instead of focusing on the very dramatic instances of a religious emotional subjectification, as described by the great mystics or extreme psychological cases, we consider its more routine occurrences, and we resist a dualism between intrinsic and extrinsic religion, seeing them rather as dialectically linked.

ability to feel emotions sanctioned by the wider regime when in the presence of its sacred objects is taken to be a proof of piety (see, e.g., Csordas 1997; Meyer 2006 on the process of incorporation into Charismatic Christianity). One may not understand the sacred narrative to which an object belongs, one may doubt the truth of the dogma surrounding it, but, if it provokes appropriate emotions, its sanctity is confirmed by the reaction. The tears shed before the icon confirm that one is a true believer, and confirm that the icon, and the saint it represents, is holy.

To see what is at stake, we can note the difference between people looking at a religious painting in an art gallery, and others venerating it in the context of a church service; or between an audience watching an actor playing a vicar and a congregation being led by a vicar in worship; or between a group of students in a lecture on Kierkegaard and a congregation listening to a preacher make reference to the same philosopher. The objects are the same: the difference lies in the emotional subjectifications. In the process of subjectification cultural objects may be used to produce, and thereafter justify, innovative acts, meanings, or images that help express the emotions of individuals.

Some forms of religion place more stress on the subjective side of the dialectic than others. In most forms of Evangelical Christianity, for example, it is vital to witness to one's conversion and personal devotion with some show of emotion. Many forms of holistic 'mind, body, spirit' spirituality also place a high premium on personal, inward experience, and rather less on outward, external forms (Heelas and Woodhead 2005). As in charismatic religion, the most personal and deeply felt emotions can be stimulated by the most external and objective array of material and symbolic configurations. People entering such a context for the first time may be overwhelmed and terrified by what they feel to be the emotional coercion of such a setting. Nevertheless, even powerful objectifications cannot force a corresponding subjectivization. A novice who enters a convent in medieval Italy may find that the silence, the cold, stark buildings, and images of the crucified Christ fill her with dread or numbness—or with the expected religious emotions. Some who desperately want to feel the approved emotions of a religious regime, and who contemplate the objects that inspire such feelings in others, may fail. Or entirely inappropriate objects may stimulate profoundly pious emotion: like the parrot Loulou who is experienced as the Holy Ghost by the maid Félicité in Flaubert's *A Simple Heart*.

When successful for the regime, the process of objectivization–subjectivization involves a focusing of emotional life, in which approved emotions are brought to the fore; a clarifying in which extraneous emotions are suppressed; and an emotional transcendence that opens a new emotional perspective. In the process the individual may feel him or herself redefined through divine encounter. Religious objects become levers of emotional life. They serve to bring forward certain emotions, and to push others into the background. By contemplating the crucifix, for example, one may cultivate compassion for others, and by contemplating Mary and the Christ child, a mother may refresh unconditional love for a child. Intellectual discourses on dogma may provoke nothing but doubt and confusion; contemplation of a holy object may force a solution. Nouwen (2000: 21) provides an example in recollecting his contemplation of an icon that represents the holy trinity as three angel-like figures sitting at a table:

> During a hard period of my life in which verbal prayer has become nearly impossible and during which mental and emotional fatigue had made me the victim of feelings of despair and fear, a long and quiet presence to this icon became the beginning of my healing. As I sat for long hours in front of Rublev's Trinity, I noticed how gradually my gaze became a prayer. This silent prayer slowly made my inner restlessness melt away and lifted me into the circle of love, a circle that could not be broken by the powers of the world . . . Through the contemplation of this icon we come to see with our inner eyes that all engagements in this world can bear fruit only when they take place within this divine circle.

Emotional life flows in real time as a continuous stream. It is only occasionally that individuals stand outside the stream to confront their emotions—an occurrence that is often provoked by some emotional dissonance. Religion also allows individuals to confront their emotions, whether through techniques honed for the purpose—such as shamanic rituals like those recorded in Nepal by Desjarlais (1992), or confessional practices like those developed in Catholicism (Mahoney 1989). The core issue of confession relates to inner emotions rather than outward trespasses, and forgiveness depends on an emotional recognition of having trespassed. As Goffman (1971) and Hochschild (1983) remind us, modern secular regimes provoke individuals to ask whether their emotional behaviour corresponds with their feelings 'backstage'. In such contexts sacred space may also serve as a back stage where people can withdraw from the role plays of the public

front stage, and enter an alternate ordering. Many religions offer practical approaches to emotional work. It may be performed in solitary meditation or prayer; in dialogue with an elder or confessor; in a group in collective ritual; in rituals of exorcism and healing; in relation to objects of devotion.

A person's relation to a religious object intensifies as its dialectical character unfolds. This means that it no longer becomes a formal encounter between a person and an external, religious object. The person merges with the symbol through the dialectical bond between objectification and subjectification. The person relates to the symbol in a way that manifestly ascribes it with religious associations. These are evoked as the person observes the object. This relation may hold only for a specific person. However, such relations are transferable in a community with a shared emotional programme. Other members of the community are able to recognize symbolic objects and they react in a similar manner when they observe the object. An emotional bond also grows between an individual and a community of persons—past and present—who share the same emotional reactions to the same object, and solidarity is enhanced. As John Wesley put it: if your heart is as my heart, give me your hand.[4]

Consecration and insignation

Although we have tried to focus the discussion of subjectification and objectification exclusively on emotional relations between individual and symbol, the social aspects of the process have kept creeping in. We have seen that the objects that are the subject of religious feeling are often collective symbols, that the intensity of subjectification is increased when others feel deeply about the same symbols, and that symbols created to express religious emotions may be adopted by a community and used to focus its identity and clarify its boundaries. In order to analyse more precisely the emotional significance of relations between the symbols and social groups in our conceptual scheme, we use the terms 'consecration' and 'insignation'. By consecration we mean the process by which a religious community, and/or its elite, legitimates an object as a religious sign that binds the community and

[4] Sermon 34: 'Catholic Spirit'; 2 Kgs 10: 15.

helps to define its identity. Although formal or informal religious leaders may play an important role in consecration, symbols once consecrated accrue their own power, which may eventually balance or outweigh that of the leaders—whose authority is then legitimated by reference to such symbols. Consecrated symbols help define the emotional regime of a religious group, act as points of emotional focus, communicate the emotional norms of the community, and define the identity of the group.

There are parallels between consecration and objectification, though objectification refers to a process that occurs at an individual level, and consecration refers to a collective process. Just as the dialectical counter-process of objectification is subjectification, so that of consecration is insignation. 'Insignation' refers to the process whereby a community is moved and inspired by a religious symbol. Insignation is the process whereby symbols are refashioned and proposed, a sort of wellspring of cultural creation. If a consecrated object fails to evoke appropriate emotional reactions in a religious group, the dialectic is disrupted (see Chapter 4). Contrariwise, if an object inspires powerful collective emotions in a group, but is not taken up and officially legitimized, the dialectical process is interrupted. Where the dialectical process is in balance, there is a positive feedback between consecrated symbols and collective emotions, each reinforcing the power of the other.

A strong form of consecration occurs when a state establishes standards for religious symbols. A law against blasphemy, for example, invokes legal power to ensure that religious objects should not provoke inappropriate emotions. The leaders of a religious group can also set and enforce standards for emotional expression 'from above' through their consecration of symbols—as Pope Pius IX did in establishing the piety of 'Fortress Catholicism' (Woodhead 2004: 312–14). There is always the possibility, however, that such consecration will not attract an appropriate emotional response from the community, and that insignation will fail. A softer kind of consecration can be traced in a group that evolves its own tales, symbols, and rituals as focal points in its emotional regime. Consecrated symbols may eventually come to be regarded as natural symbols that do not demand further legitimation. By means of the consecrated symbols it is possible to evaluate which emotions are sacred and appropriate and which are unholy, blasphemous, or even demonic. Thus the symbols form a shared language by which the community can communicate shared experiences. This

language contains a vocabulary of symbolic references and a grammar for ordering complex, confusing, and contradictory emotional experiences. Its symbols are referents that can maintain emotional associations and memories beyond the actual experiences. They are also media for transferring emotional experiences and interpretations to new members of the community.

Consecrated symbols not only enable the community to have shared emotional experiences; they also restrict the range of emotions that are accepted as religious by the community. They serve as a resource for emotional appeals by the leadership, but they also bind the leaders to the agenda that led to their consecration. The consecrated symbols determine the agenda for the emotional regime. Even if the leadership tries to change the programme of the community, this calls for reference to the consecrated symbols. As we will see in Chapter 5, this means that collective symbols have their own power. Even if the elite dismiss the symbols as outdated and primitive, they linger as memories that evoke good or bad emotions among members. Symbols that have established their ability to provoke religious sentiment—which are firmly insignated—can be reinterpreted or 'desecrated' by elites, but cannot be ignored or easily suppressed.

The process of insignation may be based on individual subjectification but proposes a collective symbol. As Durkheim (1912/2001) recognizes, emotional experiences are amplified and justified by being shared, and emotional encounters with a religious symbol are heightened: 'within a crowd moved by a common passion, we become susceptible to feelings and actions of which we are incapable on our own' (1912/2001: 157). We can often observe that emotions relating to a symbol form a chain reaction. At first, individuals may hesitate to show their feelings. However, after the first participant has shown an emotional reaction, others allow themselves to follow. Individual emotions grow by following a collective trend, and emotional expressions are amplified by being shared. Durkheim sees how symbols can focus, crystallize and communicate such emotion and sustain it over time: 'Religious force', he comments, 'is the feeling the collectivity inspires in its members, but projected and objectified by the minds which feel it. It becomes objectified by being anchored in an object which then becomes sacred, but any object can play this role' (1912/2001: 174).

Though close to ours, Durkheim's approach does not identify situations in which the dialectic between consecration and insignation is disrupted or ceases to work (see next chapter), nor pay sufficient

attention to the 'content' of symbols and their 'fittingness' to carry the emotions characteristic of a particular emotional regime. There is often more of a fit between object and emotional inspiration than he acknowledges. A religious community may have a sacred text that explicitly points to a sacred symbol—such as the rainbow in Genesis for the Jewish people—without utilizing that symbol. Even though it is not self-evident which symbols will be accepted by a religious community for communal veneration, in retrospect the logic can often be discerned. The logic of choosing symbolic objects depends on many factors, crucially upon whether members of the group are able to insignify it—to relate to it with appropriate feeling. Religious communities establish internal standards for accepted forms of symbol. Some themes and forms are taboo. For instance, Jewish religion, Islam, and Calvinism prohibit the representation of God by painting or sculpture, but not by poetry or music. Sometimes a community engages in heated battles about whether an object is an appropriate symbol for it or not. Emotional issues are often hidden in the heated debates about which symbolic forms are right or wrong. Reactions are especially strong if a work of art or a piece of music provokes emotions that some find discordant with the wider emotional regime. Rational protestations do not suffice when the core issue is emotional and the other party seems to be deaf to clashing emotional notes.

An object is also more likely to be ascribed with emotional significance when it is significant in other social domains. For instance, objects that are associated with a socio-cultural elite are likely to be consecrated and accepted by religious communities that seek legitimacy. Obversely, some religious communities may consecrate objects that are rejected by the socio-cultural elite in order to demonstrate their distance from it. Many Christian cathedrals and 'high' churches have impressive and ancient architecture, sophisticated choral music, and priceless art. The panoply is impressive and expensive, signifying tradition and accepted style. The setting calls for a sense of awe, solemnity, deference, and respect. This can be contrasted with the setting of a low-church meeting in a modified workshop with few symbols. Here it is the preaching, music, and the dramaturgical choreography that form the objectified framework for evoking religious emotions. The setting lends itself to feeling by participating by song, testimony, speaking in tongues, and falling into trance.

Symbols can also become sacred by their placement as well as their content and wider associations. A painting, for example, may become

sacred when placed in a church, where its symbolism is associated with other religious symbols and it is received accordingly. When a popular song is used in a church, it becomes ascribed with a new, religious meaning by its affiliation to the ritual: for instance, Mendelssohn's incidental music for *A Midsummer Night's Dream* and Wagner's march from *Lohengrin* became standard music for weddings. An interesting example of the process is offered by the introduction of new murals in the ancient Cathedral of Ribe (948). Its apse now presents abstract fresco murals and painted windows by Carl-Henning Petersen (1913–2007), a well-respected painter who belonged to the Cobra group. However, the artist was not a member of the state church and did not consider himself a Christian. At the viewing, he explained his work as a celebration of life, not of God: the pastor retorted that his views were pantheistic and pagan. After long debate, the congregation accepted the murals, and they achieved an insignation corresponding to their placement. Worshippers began to ascribe the abstract forms with new meanings. Memories from services, baptisms, marriages, or burials became associated with the abstract forms, and they began to elicit emotions appropriate to the regime in which they were set.

Emotional reactions to religious symbols also depend on social factors, such as the size of the community, its relation with majority society, and its cultural heterogeneity. A closed circle of connoisseurs or afficionados, or a group of specially selected persons, can establish more intense and intimate relations than a wide network of people. The use of esoteric symbols and 'shibboleths' indicates membership of a tight circle, and may evoke the whole heritage of the group. One example is provided by sectarian groups that seek to maintain a distance from wider society, and who employ complex and demanding rituals and symbols. Another is provided by diasporic communities whose members experience collective emotion provoked by shared symbols brought from the homeland (though the symbols and their meanings may change significantly in the new setting). Members of a minority can feel that they belong together because their emotional reactions to certain symbols are similar—and serve to separate them from the majority. Thus Danish expatriates in Australia gather for 'a real Christmas' and commemorate rituals associated with the darkest and coldest period of the year at beach parties, and Vietnamese immigrants gather in the Roman Catholic church in Kristiansand or in the Buddhist temple at Aarhus to affirm that they are not alone in a sea of strangers but belong to a community of shared sensibility. The

exhibition of shared religious symbols can be an effective means by which marginal and minority groups redefine identities ascribed them by a majority, and assert their identity in their own terms. A group may even accept a symbol that was ascribed for it by its oppressors as a symbol of exclusion—such as the six-pointed star for Judaism. Rountree (2004) gives a rich account of how goddess worshippers and 'witches' manipulate symbols in order to redefine the status of women. A similar analysis can be given of the way in which religious dress has been deployed by minority religions in Europe. Controversies surrounding Sikh turbans and Muslim headscarves are 'passionate' because the symbols carry a set of values and associated emotions into the heart of regimes where many secular or Christian Europeans feel they do not belong. One reaction is to ban such symbols, another is to ridicule them. The Danish cartoonists took the latter route, and the anger that this provoked among many Muslims related not only to their being subject to ridicule, but to the emotional dissonance that the cartoons provoke. Although the ban on pictorial images of Muhammad is not absolute, his depiction in cartoons—let alone as a terrorist—can affect believers' ability to retain personal and largely unobjectified images and feelings about him as the perfect human being.

Very often people are alienated by symbols that do not fit with the emotional regime they consider religious. However, the strangeness of an emotional symbolism can also offer an exotic appeal, and a means for social change. It came as a surprise to many of the older generation in Western societies when varieties of Eastern religion became popular among young people in the 1960s. Many of the so-called new religions were deliberately challenging to existing emotional regimes—including Christian ones that stressed deference, solemnity, and emotional self-control. Eastern religions offered a storehouse of clashing symbols and alternative emotional possibilities, including sensual and ecstatic ones. The movement founded by Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, for example, exalted sexual love and valued cathartic emotional expressions. Bhagwan stated that: 'Sitting in a group, in an encounter group, or in a group touching each other's bodies, you become part of the community. Touching each other's hand, holding each other's hand, or lying on top of each other in a pile, you feel oneness—a religious elation happens' (Mullan 1983: 111). The emotional tone of the blessing darshans at Poona was described by a participant in these words: 'the atmosphere was filled with joy and festivity . . . other sannyasins danced ecstatically around him [Baghwan] in a semicircle and the

group swayed to the music. The whole experience was like opening out or being totally receptive to the flow of energy' (Mullan 1983: 26). Although many new religious movements seemed at first to expand the emotional repertoire, over time they might appear to restrict it. We can see a historical example in the development of Shaker worship. At first, services were emotional and spontaneous: 'When they meet for their worship, they fall on groaning and trembling, and every one acts alone for himself' (Roberts 1990: 177). Later, the services became ritualized and the symbols fixed, and tightly controlled group dances evolved with men dancing as one group and women as a separate unit.

Since a community and its cultural context change over time, the symbolic references change as well. Symbols may lose their inspirational capacity when they become distant from or discordant with emotional regimes in other social domains. We explore this process in relation to late modern, highly differentiated societies in Chapter 6. For those who share their emotional experiences with others in their encounter with a religious symbol, that symbol may cease to be merely a symbol and becomes a direct manifestation of the divine. For outsiders, however, the same symbol may be meaningless, banal, or kitsch. There is a difference between relating to sacred objects as symbols and regarding them as possessing divine power. While intellectuals tend to take the former position, devotees take the latter. There is, however, internal religious scepticism towards objectifications in religion, as we have noted in relation to Judaism, early Christianity, Islam, and iconoclastic Protestantism. Religious reforms often attempt to purify religious symbolism and excise 'idolatry'. Clear theological distinctions may be drawn between 'veneration' of an icon (approved) and 'worship' (disapproved), and missionary encounters with non-Christian religions prompted lengthy treatises by Hindu and Buddhist reformers on the non-idolatrous nature of their religions. What we see here, in effect, are attempts by religious elites to impose order on popular emotions, and to purify religious emotional regimes. In some cases new consecrations, re-consecrations, or de-consecrations are attempted. Generally speaking, a perfect harmony between consecration and insignation is probably the exception rather than the norm: the most perfectly orchestrated rituals can fail to evoke the expected emotions, and those emotions may instead attach themselves to symbols that no elite had authorized.

Externalization and internalization

Berger and Luckmann's cognitive theory (1966) explores the dialectic between 'externalization' and 'internalization', showing how society makes an impression on the minds of individuals (internalization), and individuals give their ideas social expression (externalization). This analysis can be broadened and extended to apply not only to cognition narrowly defined, but to emotions as well. Individual emotional experiences and social sentiments are closely related.

Internalization refers to the ways in which a community influences individuals' emotional lives. It is directly related to externalization. The emotional programme set by the religious regime becomes effective only as it is internalized in the lives, actions, bodies, and feelings of those whom it binds together. The community acts, and individuals respond; individuals respond, and the community acts. Emotional externalizations affect the wider group, and can amplify, confirm, or confront, other people's feelings. By externalizing emotions in a harmonious and coordinated way, emotional standards are established that confirm personal sentiments, and help create an emotional regime that transcends them. Externalization refers to the process by which an individual feels something for him or herself and is moved by it. It is deeply personal, but is not normally private. People's feelings are noticed by others, and have an effect on them. People express their feelings through acts, and actions consolidate emotions. Actions seem more sincere and intense when they are carried by a clear personal feeling. Moreover, by performing an emotional act, the feeling is clarified and intensified. To externalize emotion by creating a communal sentiment involves encouraging and supporting appropriate individual emotions, and curtailing and sanctioning deviant ones.

A useful example for illuminating the process is provided by Benjamin Zablocki's study (1971) of the Pietistic community of Bruderhof, which points to a number of different mechanisms by which a community may shape collective sentiment: it may provide a trigger mechanism for personal emotional experiences (for example, when its elders model and express a mood), it may intensify selected emotions among its members (for example, by setting an experience within a positive framework of interpretation), it may stabilize certain emotions and moods (for example, by dampening their sporadic nature and

controlling their intensity), and it may sanction emotions that deviate from the regime. Through processes of socialization, members of the community are predisposed to have certain emotional experiences and not others, to identify appropriate emotions, and to internalize norms for emotional expression in certain situations. The community prepares its members for certain experiences by forming social contexts that inspire these emotions, and orchestrating the participants' acts. It organizes events that stimulate emotions in correspondence with its regime. It may define the situation in a way that highlights certain emotions. It may refer to symbols that are ascribed with an emotional content. It may filter a spectrum of emotions by stimulating those that fit into its programme and subduing others.

There is a difference between an emotional programme (which refers to the emotions a community aims to establish) and emotional norms (which refer to how emotional acts are evaluated by a community).[5] Some emotional expressions are obligatory in a certain situation, some are accepted, some are frowned upon, and some are forbidden or unthinkable. The norms depend on the definition of the situation. A specific situation may call for sorrow, joy, happiness, gratitude, solemnity, or disgust. The definition of the appropriate emotions for the situation depends on the group, and the emotional standard of each participant is influenced by the norms of the group. In a closely integrated community with a clear structure of authority, such as Bruderhof, the norms are especially strong.

In a loosely connected religious community with a weak authority structure, such as a Danish Lutheran congregation, the emotional norms are less well defined. However, it is still possible to track emotional norms by how other people react. Internalization implies that a person recognizes the collective emotional programme and accepts its norms for emotional behaviour in relevant situations. Spontaneous, ambiguous, and overwhelming personal feelings can be interpreted, controlled, and directed by referring to the wider regime. A religious event may be disrupted if it is subject to too many spontaneous emotional outbursts. Shared emotional norms help to integrate a community, as emotional energies are channelled into a common stream. The members accept a common frame of reference for their emotions, and they have common standards for what they ought to feel and how

[5] This corresponds to the distinction made by Hochschild (1998).

to express these emotions in a relevant situation. Thereby emotional ambiguities, uncertainties, and dissonances are diminished, and conflicts are controlled.

Deviant emotional expressions can spoil the communal sentiment for other participants and undermine its leadership. In an authoritarian community, people who deviate from the collective emotional norms can be subject to harsh sanctions. An omission of emotional expressions in a situation where they are required may be interpreted as a provocation. Some acts aim directly at transgressing the norms. At a Lutheran confirmation in Denmark, a boy took the chalice of wine and said 'cheers'. The expected laughter did not arise. Ice-cold stares from adult participants told the boy that a serious norm had been transgressed. Even if it is well known that few of the confirmed recognize the religious meaning of the event, they are still supposed to perform their roles in accordance with the programme. The act of spontaneous provocation disrupted the collective sentiment.

Emotional norms can often be decoded by observing what constitutes a transgression. In Richard Curtis's 1994 film *Four Weddings and a Funeral*, the solemn emotional programme is disturbed by the vicar's mispronouncing of the 'holy ghost' as 'the holy goat'. In a similar manner, Rowan Atkinson's 'Mr Bean' acts in an awkward manner that reveals the norms by his transgressions. When he attends a church service, he disturbs others and falls asleep on the floor during the sermon. We can identify with such failed internalizations and laugh at them in the cinema, but they are more likely to be experienced as embarrassing or annoying in real life. Emotionally misaligned acts provoke emotional tensions among other participants that often result in anger. In many cases, however, emotional deviations are not a conscious provocation. For instance, children may play in a graveyard because they see it as just a park without recognizing a demand for solemnity. When children transgress norms for religious emotions, adults are expected to educate them. By indicating that the park is not for amusement, children can be taught to obey the appropriate emotional norms. An emotional act is not acceptable just because of its personal sincerity.

Religious emotions may demarcate the borderline that separates insiders from outsiders. A religious community may draw a line of distinction between the flock of true believers who are encompassed by bonds of love, and outsiders who are regarded as unworthy of affection, or as dangerous and deviant. Such a boundary is especially

sharp in 'religions of difference' (Heelas and Woodhead 2001). Someone who breaks the norms of an Amish community, for example, may be shunned and treated as an outsider. Some sectarian groups are bound by norms of hospitality to the stranger, but for others openness to outsiders poses a risk of spiritual contamination. As Douglas (1966) shows, purity laws are effective ways of demarcating and defending social and personal boundaries: emotions of horror and disgust and bodily contamination can encompass not only intimate bodily practices such as eating and sexual intercourse, but attitudes towards outsiders who threaten the integrity of the community. In some historical instances, a specific religious institution can dominate society and define its emotive norms in an authoritative manner. In such instances, transgressions of the emotional norms are regarded as both a sacrilege and an anti-social provocation. Acts that transgress the emotional norms can be explained in religious terms as an effect of demon possession or witchcraft. Witches display and inspire the wrong emotions within a community, personifying feelings like envy, enmity, and vindictiveness.

Puritanism is characterized by strongly internalized emotions, with a regime that calls for personal submission. The emotional scale is narrowed down to love of God and one's neighbour and fear for one's salvation. According to Puritan preachers, men are 'guilty before God, of all the sins that swarm and roar in the whole world at this day, for God looks to the heart' (Morgan 1966: 2). Salvation does not depend on good deeds, but on receiving God's grace by faith. Spontaneous emotions are dangerous: 'if you live at random at your heart's desire you may be sure you are no believer' (Morgan 1966: 5). Good Christians are bound by a covenant with God, and must relinquish their own feelings and desires to his demands: 'a Christian may and ought to desire many things as meanes, but God alone, as his End, as his last end . . . no Creature that is finite can be the end of the Soul, nor give satisfaction to it' (Morgan 1966: 15–16). Puritan asceticism did not, however, mean a celibate life or abstention from good food and drink. Good and natural gifts from God should not be refused, but Christians must be thankful to the giver of these gifts, and not indulge in them, because they are a foretaste of the greater and eternal gifts that believers receive in heaven. The only important aim is salvation, and indulgence in the illusory, short-term benefits of this life can hinder people from a spiritual life in search for eternal bliss. Any act that could lead to frivolous emotional expression—especially erotic

emotions involved in dancing and boisterous feasts—was forbidden. Puritans were seen by outsiders as killjoys: they saw themselves as carrying a permanent and true religious joy in contrast to the short-term satisfactions of sinners that ended first with a hangover and eventually with damnation.

For Puritan theology, the Fall has deprived human beings of control over their passions and affections. The consequence is not that affections should be banished, but that they should be educated, controlled, disciplined, and purified. Puritan love letters demonstrate controlled affections: 'lest we should forget our selves and love this world too much, and not set our affections on heaven wheare all true happiness is for ever' (Morgan 1966: 51). Even sexual desire and satisfaction are acceptable within the context of marriage. Love, including sexual love, is a mutual duty between the couple, a solemn obligation imposed by God. The husband stands before the wife in the place of God, and is obliged to protect her and furnish her with the fruits of the earth. A wife must submit joyfully to her husband's instructions and commands: true conjugal affection demands that wives look at their husbands not for their own ends but to be better fitted for God's service. If husband and wife fail to love each other appropriately, they disobey God. But the highest love must be reserved for God himself. To prize human relations too highly is to upset the proper order of love. Man and wife should not, therefore, be so 'transported with affection' that they forget their maker. Romantic love that transgresses these limits is regarded as a demonic temptation. A widow or widower should not demonstrate immoderate grief, but keep sentiment within bounds, and hope to meet the beloved again in the afterlife. Human affections must maintain proper moderation. A dying pastor sends his wife away from his deathbed and instructs her to go and pray alone with the words: 'I fear lest thou look too much upon this affliction.' True believers in God's providence must exercise patience and meekness in all losses and crosses in this life. They are required to restrain their spontaneous emotions and internalize the emotional regime of Puritanism.

The Puritan regime also illustrates how certain emotional norms may refer only to a segment of the community or to special roles within it. For instance, many regimes allow women to cry publicly at a funeral, while men are supposed to control their feelings. In order to be in tune with the emotions of a community, a person has to sense its emotional programme and have a notion of its potential harmony.

To tune into an emotional programme involves an acute awareness of emotional signals from other participants: it represents a social art that is acquired through experience. Certain roles call for extensive training in order to join in the performance. People practise from childhood to demonstrate emotions in a manner that others can interpret, and teenagers especially like to experiment with emotional expressions. A religious community designates religious roles that include specific emotional norms. A shaman, prophet, sibyl, witch, or rabbi is expected to demonstrate certain emotions and abstain from others. The norms also cover everyday life, where a holder of a religious role is expected to demonstrate a special emotional stance towards others. Again, the norms can be decoded by looking at transgressions, such as a Danish female pastor who drove her motorbike down to the harbour in order to drink and gossip with the sailors; or the stereotypical Anglican vicar in whose presence people monitor their language, curtail their swearing, and try to express only 'polite' sentiment.

Internalization is constantly balanced—or challenged—by externalization. Contrary to the impression that Durkheim gives of collective emotions being irresistibly imposed upon individuals in a religious setting, each individual is likely to have personal standards for what they ought to feel in a situation and how their feelings may be expressed. In order to form a correspondence between the communal programme and the individual standards, a link must be formed between the community and its members. For the latter simply to 'go through the motions' and feign feelings is not sufficient to sustain the regime. Feelings are social acts as well as personal ones. They are performed in a direct or indirect interaction with other people, and they lead to immediate or delayed emotional reactions. Both the actor and the audience can read expressions of sorrow, joy, tension, awe, disgust, hatred, and anxiety. Such emotions form a basic element in social interaction: the small and great dramas of social life revolve around them. A person's emotional expressions have a social reference: they can express a stance to oneself, to specific persons, to a community, or to society at large. Even to escape and seek solitude forms part of a social pattern and makes a social statement.

Rosabeth Kanter's study (1972) of utopian communities shows that those that survived over a generation depended not so much on ideological coercion by elites, nor self-interested calculation by members, but on establishing affective moral commitments. The former involved a dual process of 'renunciation' of former ties and

'communion' with the new group, and the latter a 'mortification' of egotism and existing commitments and a 'transcendence' whereby the cause of the group seems compellingly true, eternal, and just. Mortification involves feelings of humility and worthlessness, while transcendence involves the exhilaration and joy experienced by individuals who merge with the group. Kanter (1972: 105) writes: 'the use of mortification is a sign that the group cares about the individual, about his thoughts and feelings, about the content in this world. The group cares enough to pay great attention to the person's behaviour, and to promise him warmth, intimacy, and love . . . if he indicates he can accept these gifts without abuse.' Membership generates a sense of mystery and a feeling of awe for the leaders. In our terms, a closed community like Oneida succeeded in balancing internalization with externalization in such a way that members experienced the costs of sacrificing material interests, external bonds, and individual self-interest as outweighed by the emotional gain of merging with the group.

Demonstrations of religious emotion have wider social consequences beyond the religious community. By externalizing religious emotions, individuals adopt a social stance that may lead to active engagement in wider society, a universalist love for humanity that provokes humanitarian concern for the distant others, loyalty to one's cultural, ethnic, or familial kin and suspicion of others, retreat from an evil and corrupt society, or violence and hostility towards that society. A religious setting may allow people to feel and express emotions that are suppressed in everyday life, may help people redefine or redirect their social emotions, or may support and sustain the acceptable emotional norms of the wider community.

Although religious norms may be presented as timeless and indisputable, they are constantly subject to challenge and redefinition. If the members fail to internalize them, leaders have to make the norms more explicit and appeal to them, or redefine and revise them. If the processes of externalization are inoperative, internalizations become dampened and dissonant. The community will eventually find such a state unsatisfactory. Some members may drift away; others may try to voice a critique. However, it is extremely difficult to change the emotional programme of a religious community, and where change does take place it may have to be masked (Halbwachs 1992; Repstad 2008). Nevertheless, a dysfunctional programme will eventually lead to a passive and uncommitted membership or to a major re-formation or split. This theme will be followed up in the next chapter.

Dialectical feedback

The proposed approach recognizes that many social processes are characterized by mutually interacting factors, rather than being the effect of a series of isolated causes. The emotional processes operative in religious regimes have a two-way character. They can stabilize, amplify, modify, or extinguish each other through feedbacks and adjustments.[6] What this means is that an outcome is not merely the static and self-contained effect of a cause, but that it has a positive or negative impact on its preconditions. Thus emotions may increase social solidarity, bring about personal change, lead to adjustments of power, and reinforce the power of a collective symbol. Similarly, if a religious service fails to elicit appropriate emotions on the part of some participants, that may lead to an adjustment of the ritual and symbols, a challenge to leadership, the use of guidance or sanctions to enforce conformity, and so on.

In relation to human emotions in general, and religious emotions in particular, simple, mechanical processes—like the individualist–behaviourist ideal-typical model of an emotional stimulus causing an emotional response—are the exception rather than the norm. With dramatic exceptions—like a man who kills another because he feels insulted—emotional relations are more often two way than one way. Dialectics may certainly involve juxtapositions and contradictions, as Hegelian and Marxist traditions emphasize.[7] However, as Georges Gurwitch (1962) points out, a dialectical process need not imply polarization.[8] Among other possible outcomes are complementarity, mutual involvement, ambivalence, or mutual immanence. In this

[6] The notions of positive and negative feedback, derived from cybernetics, are inadequate to capture the range of processes involved, which include approval, reinforcement, sanctioning, amplification, mirroring, disapproval, refinement, punishment and so on.

[7] Karl Marx's work is one of the major sources for social dialectics. He said: 'As society itself produces man as a man, so is society produced by him' (Marx 1964: 137). His approach has inspired both the Frankfurt School and French post-war sociology, including Jean-Paul Sartre (1960) and Merleau-Ponty (1964). Horkheimer and Adorno discussed the dialectic of the enlightenment project, which aimed at human control over nature by way of demystified science and technology, but ended with a reified world that controls human life. Merleau-Ponty (1964: 20) argued that man appears as a product-producer, the locus where necessity can turn into concrete liberty.

[8] Gurwitch (1962) pointed in his micro-sociology to the reciprocity of perspectives between the I, the Other, and the We, and in his macro-sociology to the forces of structuration, destructuration, and restructuration. His analysis included symbols as mediators between the contents and the collective and individual agents, and thereby resembles our approach.

chapter we focus on relations of complementarity and mutual involvement; in the next on ambivalence and polarity.

The normal focus of sociological interest is on the dialectics between social agent and structure. We have drawn on a number of different traditions in developing this element of our scheme, including Simmel,[9] Berger and Luckman,[10] Giddens,[11] Archer and Bhaskar.[12] But we have extended the reference of 'dialectics' by applying it to relations between individual agents and symbols, as well as to relations between society and symbols. There are precedents for this, not least in the work of Marx for whom dialectics includes not only relations between agents and social structure, but those between material conditions of production and social relations of production, and between production and reproduction. For Durkheim, as we have seen, the dialectic between society and collective symbol was of prime importance; for Simmel, that between individual agent and symbol was also significant. Clearly the nature of the dialectics between agent and symbol is not identical with those between social agents, and processes of

[9] Simmel's dialectics are influenced by the Neo-Kantian distinction between form and content. He speaks of 'a dialectic without reconciliation' between human life and social forms: 'The individual is contained in sociation and, at the same time, finds himself confronted by it. He is both a link in the organism of sociation and an autonomous organic whole; he exists both for society and for himself' (Simmel 1908/1971b: 17). Simmel discusses dialectical relations between strife and sociation, imitation and distinction, distance and closeness.

[10] Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann developed a dialectical constellation of theses derived from Weber, Durkheim, and the young Marx: 'Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product' (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 61). Their approach ties the subject and the social world together by dialectical processes of cognitive internalization, objectification, and externalization.

[11] Anthony Giddens's structuration theory (1979) can be read as a dialectical attempt to combine philosophy of action with theories of social structure. Giddens sees the production and reproduction of society as a skilled performance on the part of its members, but human agency is bounded. Human beings produce society as historically located actors. Structure is constituted through action and it both enables and constrains agents (Giddens 1976/1993). Giddens (1979: 6) especially refers to the 'dialectic of control' as the central problem of social theory, which points to an intrinsic relation between agency and power.

[12] Critical-realist theory based on Roy Bhaskar (in Archer 1998) distinguishes between the genesis of human action and the structures governing social activities. These form distinct strata of social reality. Critical-realist research analyses the processes by which structure and agency shape and reshape one another. The linkage between structure and agency depends on a 'mediating system' consisting of the positions occupied and the practices that the occupants engage in. By distinguishing between structure and agency, critical realism is able to identify contextual restraints on our freedoms and to specify strategic uses of our freedoms for social transformation (Archer 1998). Our approach follows this distinction. However, we have not been able to follow Bhaskar's dialectical theory (1993) completely.

feedback are not necessarily communicative in the same ways. Yet we follow Durkheim and Simmel in maintaining that there can nevertheless be reciprocity and mutual constitution, and we have shown in the examples above that these processes can be every bit as significant for emotional life as those between persons.

The processes that constitute a balanced religious emotional regime can be represented diagrammatically, as in Fig. 1. In such a regime an agent's emotions are shaped by internalizing norms enacted by a community, and by subjectifying emotions related to sacred symbols. The agent may objectify religious emotion by creating or appropriating symbols that are emotionally meaningful to him or her. Feelings relating to such symbols are shared with others in the process of insignation, and insignation is disciplined by consecration. The collective expression of emotions reinforces the emotional standards of the religious community, which agents internalize.

The feedback between these different processes may lead to reinforcement or adjustment. If, for example, consecrated symbols do not elicit appropriate feeling, the community may solve the discrepancy by altering the symbols or guiding its members. Symbols that seem hollow because people are not able to summon the expected feelings towards them may be dismissed or recreated. Alternatively, a religious elite may feel so bound by the symbols that they are forced to admonish, punish, or even expel those who do not express appropriate sentiments and actions.



Figure 1 Dialectical relations

The emotional power of religious symbols is dependent on processes of insignation and subjectification. It is necessary that members can relate personally to the symbols, and that they also provoke appropriate collective sentiment. A religious symbol may have an appeal to a single person, perhaps as an expression of a personal memory, but it has a stronger and more stable emotional appeal if others feel similarly. Then feelings are confirmed and enhanced by the dialectical interactions.

Thus the different dialectical processes are linked together by feedback mechanisms, which can serve to reinforce an emotional regime or lead to change. By picturing the processes as operating in a circle, we can point out a clockwise and anti-clockwise spiral of feedback (Figs. 2 and 3). Although it is only possible to represent a circular process here, a spiral is perhaps a more appropriate image, since reinforcing processes do not necessarily lead to a regime that 'goes round in circles' without alteration, but to regimes that 'take another turn' through adjustments that maintain their balance. The clockwise spiral illustrated in Fig. 2 involves processes of consecration–subjectification–externalization. It may start—to give one example—with a community's consecration of a religious symbol as an exemplary expression of religious emotions. Inspired by the consecration, individual agents may subjectivize the emotions associated with it. They may also externalize their emotions in the context of the religious community.



Figure 2 Relational feedback, example 1



Figure 3 Relational feedback, example 2

This entire process may confirm consecrated symbols, or lead to new subjectifications among individual members.

An anti-clockwise spiral can also be pictured (Fig. 3) that involves processes of objectification–insignation–internalization. For example, an agent who experiences religious feelings may express them by creating or appropriating a religious symbol (objectification). That symbol is then felt to be meaningful by others in the community in a collective context (insignation). The emotions relating to the symbol may then be internalized by members of the community. This may in turn lead other individuals to objectify their religious emotion by relating to the symbol, whether by recreating, altering, or rejecting it. Thereby the symbol is affected, which leads to further processes of insignation by the community.

Although for the sake of visual clarity we have represented each of these feedback processes separately in Figs. 2 and 3, in balanced emotional regimes they operate simultaneously. If only one is operative, there is an unbalanced dialectic, as discussed in the next chapter. Our conceptual scheme is merely an analytical tool that works by dissecting the holistic flow of religious emotions within a regime. The dialectics separates out interrelated aspects of a unity, and needs to be put together again to make sense of real emotional regimes.

In reality, balanced regimes are likely to be the exception rather than the rule. But, by beginning with this case, we can go on to analyse instances when the processes are one-sided and become 'un-dialectic'.

This may occur, for example, when a regime's emotional standards are influenced by symbolic insignations that are not consecrated, or when objectifications do not correspond with the regime's emotional standards, or when externalizations are not balanced by internalization. Thus the conceptual scheme can also help pinpoint where relations become strained and positive feedback mechanisms do not operate. These themes are taken up in the next chapter.

Conclusion

This chapter proposes a framework for analysing religious emotional regimes characterized by balanced dialectical connections between self, society, and symbols. In such a regime the relations between agents, the community, and the symbols are mutually constitutive, and there is a correspondence between the emotional symbols, the community's emotional programme, and the individual emotions of the participants. Of course, it is artificial to split up the regime between these parts, because the symbols in such a situation express what the community feels collectively and the members experience individually. Each one confirms, amplifies, and empowers the others: the power of the symbols is strenghtened as they are venerated by the community and subjectified by individuals, the power of the community to move its members is enhanced as it refers to accepted symbols and as members participate in it, and religious emotions among participants are intensified as they participate in collective rituals or relate to established symbols.

A balanced regime has several mechanisms of adjustment and feedback for addressing situations where emotional dissonances or discrepancies arise. If members do not internalize and express the emotions authorized by the regime, they are guided and corrected. Protests may be talked down or suggestions and critique from members may be acccepted, rules may be adjusted, symbols rejuvenated or changed, deviations controlled, and constant nuisances condemned, made to repent, or expelled. This does not guarantee success or longevity. Balanced regimes can lack structural pressures towards innovation, reform, and adaptation to new emotional challenges, and focus more on conformity, consensus, and continuity. They may refer to the intense feelings of the founders and point to inherited symbols that

originally evoked passionate emotions; but such emotions need to be renewed and revitalized in the ritual practices and symbols of the community and the spiritual lives of the members. Moreover, as we will see in later chapters, religious emotional regimes are rarely closed systems. The ways in which they and their participants relate to other emotional regimes in society also impact upon their internal dynamics.