Purpose: This empirical study focuses on investigating the influence of Corporate Governance (CG) mechanism on shareholder value. The construct of CG mechanism is formed by separate leadership, proportion of independent director, independent chairman and independence of nomination committee based on renowned agency theory. Design/methodology/approach: The sample for this empirical study consists of 100 firms listed on Bursa Malaysia over the period 2010-14. The data regarding CG mechanism (separate leadership, proportion of independent director, independent chairman and independence of nomination committee) collected from the annual reports of the companies. While, we used earning per share as a proxy for shareholder value that is extracted from DataStream for the corresponding period (2010-2014). Findings: The models analyzed by ordinary least squares (OLS), found significant positive relation between chairman independence and shareholder value measured by earning per share. The results further revealed that independence of nomination committee has a significant negative relationship with shareholder value while, firm total assets have a significant and positive impact on shareholder value (earning per share). However, separate leadership and proportion of independent director has no impact on shareholder value. However, separate leadership and proportion of independent director showed no significant relationship with shareholder value. Originality/value: The results of the study has value for Malaysian government, policy makers, corporate boards, stock exchange, and shareholders by highlighting the distinct impact of corporate governance mechanism on shareholder value. The empirical result will also contribute to help in recommendation and improvement of Malaysian code of corporate governance (MCCG-2012) based on the extant and latest literature.