We analyze the cross-national and cross-temporal variation in the presence or absence of domestic compliance gaps for three different human rights: the right to a fair trial, children’s rights, and the right of workers to form unions. Besides constitutional provisions, which have been the focus of previous research on the de jure-de facto compliance gap, statutes, executive actions, and judicial decisions all can contain promises by domestic politicians to protect human rights. Our indicator of whether legal protection exists and how strong it is reflects the many ways states make human rights legal commitments to their citizens. Our findings show that (a) the probability of promisekeeping and the effects of combinations of accountability and capacity are different for each right; (b) strong laws are a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective protection of rights; (c) treaty participation does not affect the probability of promise-keeping for any right; (d) promise-keeping for one right predicted promise-keeping for other rights. For all rights, the number of countries with gaps grew between 1994 and 2008 and then declined between 2008 and 2019. An important inference from our findings is that international treaties may only be effective when ratifiers are willing to change their domestic laws to be consistent with international norms. One counterintuitive policy implication of our findings is that democratizing low-capacity authoritarian states may lead to more violations of some human rights.